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DO ABSTRACT IDEAS HAVE THE NEED,
THE NEED FOR SPEED?: AN EXAMINATION
OF ABSTRACT IDEAS AFTER ALICE
Maria R. Sinatra*
Imagine you invented a way to perform mathematical calculations all
over the world simultaneously. Now, imagine that you cannot patent your
invention because it was compared to, and found to contain, the same idea
as an abacus.1 This scenario was the outcome of Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International.2
In coming to its decision in Alice, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a
two-part test that it had previously utilized to analyze the patentability of
laws of nature to determine whether the patent at issue met the subject
matter patentability standards of § 101 of the Patent Act. Determining the
claim contained an abstract idea, the Court then addressed whether the
invention was a patentable application and found it was not because
“generic” computer implementation did not add “significantly more” to the
underlying idea.
Since Alice, courts have invalidated a number of patents for failing to
meet this criteria—arguably turning from the plain meaning of the Patent
Act and congressional intent. Utilizing the Alice framework, courts have
dismissed patent infringement claims in the pleading stages upon labeling
them as abstract and citing reasoning as well as utilizing terminology that
is more indicative of a § 102 or § 103 Patent Act analysis. While an
argument can be made that proactively dismissing some claims in the
pleading stages could reduce the prevalence of patent trolls and improve
the efficiency of the patent process, this Note argues that the widespread
proclivity of courts to invalidate patents under § 101 by utilizing language
indicative of § 102 and § 103 analysis robs patent holders of the ability to
have their claims analyzed under proper standards and injects subjective
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., Business Administration,
2013, Boston University. I would like to thank my mother, father, grandparents, Vin, and
Sam for their constant love and support.
1. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct.
2347 (2014) (No. 13–298) (comparing the invention at hand to an abacus being operated by
one of King Tut’s workers). An abacus was a precursor to the modern calculator and
computer and has been used since Babylonian times. See Abacus, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.britannica.com/technology/abacus-calculating-device
[http://perma.cc/VV7Z-S5DH].
2. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
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and uncertain criteria into the patent infringement analysis that could be
avoided by implementing other analytical methods.
As a remedy to the inclusion of § 102 and § 103 factors in the subject
matter patentability analysis, this Note advocates that a substantial
increase in speed or efficiency generated by an invention should be taken
into account in determining if the invention adds “significantly more” to
the idea. This would create a tangible bright-line test that would allow the
claim to move forward and be analyzed under more suitable Patent Act
sections.
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 822
I. PATENTS IN THE INFORMATION AGE..................................................... 824
A. Patents: Who, What, When, Why, and How............................. 824
B. Interpreting § 101 ..................................................................... 825
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Rise of the Information Age .................................................... 827
D. What “Significantly More” Entails .......................................... 835
E. Alice: The Invalidator of Patents ............................................ 837
II. THE CONFLICTING VIEWS ON WHETHER ALICE EXCEEDS ITS § 101
BOUNDS .......................................................................................... 839
A. Alice Blurs the Lines ................................................................ 839
B. The Alice Framework Is a Threshold Inquiry .......................... 845
III. RESTORING § 101 TO A THRESHOLD INQUIRY AND NOTHING MORE . 849
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 854

INTRODUCTION
The rise of the information age has challenged scholars and the judiciary
to determine whether an invention merely contains an unpatentable abstract
idea or whether it contains patentable subject matter.3 In an effort to clarify
its doctrine regarding abstract ideas and the judicial exceptions to
patentability, the Supreme Court recently stated in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International4 that for a patent claim containing an application of an
abstract idea to contain patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the
claim must add “significantly more” to the abstract idea than has previously
been possible in the relevant industry.5
The Alice standard has thus far led to the dismissal of many patents that
were previously granted6—some in the pleadings stage7—by utilizing
3. See infra Part I.C.
4. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (analyzing the patentability of a computerized trading
platform for eliminating risk).
5. See infra Part I.C–D.
6. See infra Part I.E.
7. See infra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.

2015]

ABSTRACT IDEAS AFTER ALICE

823

language traditionally indicative of analysis under other sections of the
Patent Act. Some view the dismissal of claims before discovery as within
the bounds of § 101 as a threshold inquiry and as beneficial for patent law,
citing improvements in judicial efficiency, protection against patent trolls,
and possible benefits for innovation.8 However, others argue that use of the
Alice framework to dispose of these claims in the pleading stages has
interjected 35 U.S.C. § 102 and § 103 criteria into the subject matter
analysis—contrary to congressional intent.9 Effectively, this view holds
that it robs the patent holder of the benefit of the clear and convincing
evidence generated by discovery and, in its place, subjects the patent holder
to analysis based largely on judicial impressions of whether the application
of the idea meets the “significantly more” standard.10
This Note analyzes whether the Alice framework blurs the line between
the sections of the Patent Act when it requires courts and the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to determine what “significantly
more” entails in the computer age. Part I of this Note provides background
information regarding patent law and the information age, the keystone
cases that have shaped the Supreme Court’s current abstract idea doctrine,
the ambiguity regarding what “significantly more” entails, and the effects
Alice has had on lower courts and the USPTO.11 Next, Part II outlines the
conflicting views regarding whether the Alice framework incorrectly blurs
the line between subject matter patentability analysis and the other sections
of the Patent Act, or whether the Alice framework works within the bounds
of § 101 as a threshold inquiry and has positively affected patent law by
allowing for the efficient dismissal of frivolous and abusive patent
litigation.12
Lastly, Part III argues that the Alice framework has negatively affected
patent law by including § 102 and § 103 requirements in the § 101 analysis,
because it imports criteria into the § 101 analysis that is traditionally
reserved for other sections of the Patent Act, it creates unnecessary
uncertainty, and it allows courts to usurp legislative decision making. It
then advocates for including a significant increase in speed or efficiency
generated by the claim in the patentability analysis under § 101 for four
reasons: (1) it would allow § 101 to conform to its traditional “coarse
filter” role in determining whether a claim deserves patent protection,
restoring the balance between the “wide scope” traditionally given to the
statutory text of § 101 and the judicial exceptions to patentability;13 (2) it
would allow for greater certainty in the subject matter patentability
analysis;14 (3) it would encourage innovation by providing incentive to

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
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investors and inventors;15 and (4) it would diminish the judiciary’s role as a
policymaker.16
I. PATENTS IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Part I of this Note provides an overview of patentable subject matter and
the rise of the information age. Part I.A discusses patents generally, while
Part I.B discusses § 101 of the Patent Act. Next, Part I.C discusses the
judicial exceptions to patentability, as well as the keystone cases that have
shaped the Supreme Court’s analysis of abstract ideas in the information
age. Part I.D then explains what the “significantly more” requirement
entails to transform an abstract idea into a patentable application. Lastly,
Part I.E describes the effects of Alice on courts and the USPTO regarding
patent invalidation under § 101.
A. Patents: Who, What, When, Why, and How
The first patent in the United States was issued in 1790 to Samuel
Hopkins for making “potash,” a fertilizer ingredient.17 Since 1790, the
USPTO has issued more than six million patents.18 A patent is a property
right granted pursuant to the U.S. Constitution19 to an inventor “to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention in the
United States or importing the invention into the United States” for a
limited time in exchange for disclosure of how the invention works.20
To obtain a patent, the invention or discovery must be filed in an
application to the USPTO, which then examines the application to
determine if the invention or discovery fits the criteria of Title 35 of the

15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, First U.S. Patent Issued Today
in 1790 (July 31, 2001), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2001/01-33.jsp [http://perma.cc/
R25Z-9SMH].
18. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Web Database Now
Includes All Patents Dating from 1790 (Nov. 6, 2000), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2000/
00-68.jsp [http://perma.cc/SDK7-RHDD].
19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . . promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). Little commentary on
the thoughts of the Framers regarding the Constitution’s intellectual property clause exists
other than the text itself, see Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early
Views on the Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 92 (1996), but some
evidence of the importance the Framers placed upon protecting author’s and inventor’s rights
can be found in the Federalist Papers, with James Madison stating that “[t]he utility of
[patent protection] will scarcely be questioned.” THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 307 (James
Madison) (Cynthia Brantley Johnson ed., 2004).
20. See General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE
(Dec.
8,
2014),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-informationconcerning-patents (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012)) [http://perma.cc/DWU3-VUVN]. Patent
protection for utility and plant patents is up to twenty years from the date the patent was
granted, and patent protection for design patents is up to fourteen years from the date the
patent was granted. See Id.
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U.S. Code.21 If the invention meets the criteria detailed in the code, the
USPTO grants the patent upon payment of a fee.22
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent can be granted to “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”23
However, if an invention or discovery falls into one of the subject matters
expressed in § 101, it must also meet the novelty condition,24 meet the
nonobvious condition,25 and be particularly described26 in order to receive
patent protection.27
In addition, four express categories of patentable subject matter are stated
in § 101: “processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of
matter.”28 One of the most debated of these categories—and of the most
importance to this Note—is process.29 A “process” does not have to be tied
to a particular machine,30 and it is defined under § 101 as a “process, art or
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material.”31 The term “method” within the
definition of “process” also “may include at least some methods of doing
business” based on the plain meaning of the dictionary term of “method”
and does not need to be tied to a particular machine in order to contain
patentable subject matter.32
B. Interpreting § 101
As a result of the conditional requirements of Title 35, courts have
viewed the patentable subject matter requirement of § 101 as a “coarse
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
24. Id. § 102. For a claimed invention to meet the “novelty” condition, it must not be
“patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available
to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention,” or it must not be
“described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or
deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application” belongs to
another inventor. See id. § 102(a)(1)–(2).
25. Id. § 103. For a claimed invention to be “nonobvious” as a whole, it must not be
“obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention
pertains.” See id.
26. See id. § 112. In order to meet the specification conditions of § 112, the patent
application must contain a “written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same.” Id. § 112(a).
27. Id. § 101 (stating that in order to receive patent protection, the invention or discovery
must meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101, as well as “the conditions and requirements
of [the whole] title”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010) (listing novelty,
nonobviousness, and particular description as requirements for patent protection in addition
to meeting the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101).
28. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 601.
29. See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). See also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 603–04.
30. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 603–04; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b); see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602.
32. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 607.
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filter.”33 Even if a patent contains subject matter sufficient to meet the
requirement of § 101, it still may fail to be granted patent protection.34
Determining whether a claim contains patentable subject matter is a “pure
question of law,”35 and the effects of this analysis on abstract ideas will be
discussed further in Part II.B of this Note.36
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,37 the Supreme Court analyzed the text of
§ 101 under the plain meaning of the statute38 and determined that Congress
contemplated that § 101 would be given a “wide scope” by including the
word “any.”39 Using this statutory interpretation, courts have found that
they “should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which
the legislature has not expressed.”40
In addition to the plain meaning of the statute, courts have found that the
legislative history indicates that patent laws should be given “broad
construction.”41 Since the first patent legislation was drafted in 1793, the
language of that legislation and all subsequent patent statutes have
contained the word “any”42—embodying the view that “ingenuity should
receive . . . liberal encouragement.”43 Even after Congress recodified the
patent laws in 1952 (“the 1952 Act”), the language including “any” in the
previous statutes remained intact.44 Committee reports surrounding the
1952 Act, as well as commentary from the principal draftsman of the 1952
recodification,45 indicate that Congress intended patentable subject matter
under § 101 to “include anything under the sun that is made by man.”46
In describing patentable subject matter under § 101, P.J. Federico, one of
the principle draftsmen of the legislation, stated that a patent can be found
eligible under the Act even if the patent utilizes a “new use of a known
machine, manufacture, composition of matter or material” if it can also
33. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980) (describing an analysis
of the statutory construction of 35 U.S.C. § 101 to determine that subject matter patentability
should be given a wide scope); see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602 (describing § 101 as “only a
threshold test”); Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (describing similar filter requirements).
34. See Research Corp. Techs., 627 F.3d at 868–69 (citing Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602).
35. Kickstarter, Inc. v. Fan Funded, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-06909-KPF, 2015 WL 3947178,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015) (citing Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d
1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012)), appeal docketed, No. 15–1886 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
38. See id. at 308–09.
39. See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent.” (emphasis added)).
40. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.,
289 U.S. 178 (1933)); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981).
41. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09; see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182.
42. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
43. Id. (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 (Washington ed. 1871)); see
also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010).
44. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
45. See Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearing on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm.
No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 37 (1951) (statement of P.J. Federico).
46. See S. REP. NO. 89-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
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satisfy the other conditions under Title 35.47 Consequently, courts have
found a broad reading of 35 U.S.C. § 101 is necessary because the
inventions most beneficial to mankind are often those that push the
boundaries of science and are often unanticipated in the drafting of patent
laws.48
C. Judicial Exceptions to Patentability Under § 101
and the Rise of the Information Age
Although Congress has expressed specific categories of subject matter
that can be patented under § 101,49 courts have created judicial exceptions
excluding “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from
patent protection.50 These judicial exceptions have existed for over a
hundred years51 to prevent “tying up”52 natural laws and inhibiting future
discoveries that might apply those basic principles.53
Although the Court tends to use the terms “law of nature” and “natural
phenomena” interchangeably,54 whether a claim contains an abstract idea is
somewhat separate, and arguably harder to ascertain,55 especially after the
rise of the computer and internet.56 Patents in the Industrial Age57 were

47. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 161, 177 (1993).
48. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 181–83
(1981).
49. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof” can be
patentable subject matter).
50. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; see also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347,
2352 (2014) (finding a claim contained an abstract idea unpatentable under § 101); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012) (finding a claim
containing a law of nature unpatentable under § 101). Although these categories are usually
depicted as the only judicial exceptions, other categories have also been described as
exceptions to patentability. See The Hon. Paul R. Michel, The Supreme Court Saps Patent
Certainty, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1751, 1757–58 (2014) (listing laws of nature, natural
phenomenon, products of nature, natural correlations, and abstract ideas as terminology
courts have used to describe exceptions).
51. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–20 (1853); Le Roy v.
Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 (1852).
52. See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1292.
53. See id. at 1293 (“[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might
tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”); Mackay Radio & Tel.
Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).
54. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948) (utilizing
the term “natural principle”); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1296. The
Court has also described a law of nature as a “scientific truth.” See id. at 1293–94. Common
examples of scientific truths are Albert Einstein’s famous formula E=mc2, which is used to
describe mass-energy equivalence, and Isaac Newton’s discovery of the law of gravity. See
id. at 1293.
55. See Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2011).
56. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010) (discussing the differences in patent
analysis between the information age and the Industrial Age).
57. The Industrial Age is typically used to denote the period between the 18th century
and 19th century in English and American history during which the Industrial Revolution
occurred. See GEORGE SOULE, ECONOMIC FORCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 150–51 (1952).

828

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

rarely granted without ties to a machine or apparatus,58 and courts have
argued that there is no evidence that “processes for organizing human
activity were or ever had been patentable.”59 Justice Stevens has even
claimed, “Prior to 1968, well-established principles of patent law probably
would have prevented the issuance of a valid patent on almost any
conceivable computer program.”60
Even when a patent claim was tied to a machine or apparatus, the Court
has invalidated claims when it was not “particularly described.”61 For
example, in O’Reilly v. Morse,62 a patent for improving upon the telegraph
was invalidated because it was not limited in scope and, as a result, it would
have foreclosed others from using the basic ideas present in the telegraph
technology63—namely utilizing “electric or galvanic current” in telegraph
operation.64
Since the 1970s however, the computer industry has experienced “rapid
growth” and has changed our daily lives.65 From 1995 to 2005, the number
of internet users tripled from roughly 513 million to nearly 1.7 billion,66
and, currently, the estimated number of users is closer to three billion—
approximately 40 percent of the world’s population.67 People now bank,68
obtain academic degrees,69 shop,70 and complete numerous other tasks
online that were never thought possible before the rise of computers,
software, and the internet.71 Scholars have dubbed this boom in
The Industrial Revolution was marked by a rapid increase in manufacturing, mass
production, and special purpose machinery. See id. at 138.
58. See Bilski, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010) (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966–76 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring)), aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
59. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 972 (Dyk, J., concurring), aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S.
593.
60. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 605.
61. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120–21 (1853).
62. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
63. See id. at 118–19.
64. See id. at 113.
65. See David C. Tunick, Has the Computer Changed the Law?, 13 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 43, 43 (1994).
66. See Oliver Burkeman, Forty Years of the Internet: How the World Changed for
Ever, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2009, 3:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2009/oct/23/internet-40-history-arpanet [http://perma.cc/5ZKN-V278].
67. See INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ (last
visited Oct. 21, 2015) (reporting that as of July 1, 2014 the estimated number of internet
users throughout the world is 2,925,249,355 people out of the total world’s population of
7,243,784,121 people) [http://perma.cc/4GQ3-WKCS].
68. See, e.g., BANK OF AM. ONLINE, https://www.bankofamerica.com/onlinebanking/
online-banking.go (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [https://perma.cc/L7XS-8AH4].
69. See, e.g., PHOENIX UNIVERSITY, http://www.phoenix.edu/colleges_divisions/
education.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/G4P9-X7B7].
70. See, e.g., AMAZON ONLINE, http://www.amazon.com/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/E9LE-UQLK].
71. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 194 n.1 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing the technological era since the first general purpose electronic digital computer
was built in 1946). The utility of the internet has even been compared to that of the
invention of the printing press. See JOHN NAUGHTON, FROM GUTENBERG TO ZUCKERBERG 24
(2012).
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technology, and the world’s subsequent transition from a goods-based
economy to a knowledge-based economy, as the information age.72
During the information age, the number of software patents issued has
increased dramatically.73 Roughly 15 percent of the U.S. patents granted in
2009 were for software inventions,74 and the market for software products
in the United States is substantial. Americans spend more money on
software than gasoline and more than double on software than they spend
on fast food.75 This expenditure is far larger than what early courts could
anticipate76 and has led to an increase in multimillion-dollar disputes
regarding software patents.77
Despite making up a significant portion of patents granted today, the
terms “software” and “computer” are not defined anywhere in Patent Act,
and controversy surrounds the issue of whether software patents are “too
abstract or too vague.”78 Although both dictionaries and the courts have
attempted to define abstraction,79 part of the problem in interpreting patent
law “is that no one understands what makes an idea ‘abstract.’”80
The Supreme Court has held that inventions concerning computer
software programs can contain patentable subject matter,81 but it recognizes
that the information age “raises new difficulties for . . . patent law.”82
72. See, e.g., NAUGHTON, supra note 71, at 189 (stating that we now “live in a
knowledge economy”); see also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing
Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 78 (2002); Note,
Antitrust and the Information Age: Section 2 Monopolization Analyses in the New Economy,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1623, 1627–28 (2001).
73. See ROBERT PLOTKIN, THE GENIE IN THE MACHINE: HOW COMPUTER-AUTOMATED
INVENTING IS REVOLUTIONIZING LAW AND BUSINESS 8–9 (2009).
74. See id. From 1998 to 2011 over 320,799 patents were issued in the technology era.
See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(Moore, J., dissenting).
75. See GREGORY A. STOBBS, United States of America, in SOFTWARE PATENTS
WORLDWIDE 9 (2014) (describing expenditures of Americans on software at $383.3 billion,
fast food at $100 billion, and gasoline at $324 billion in 2005).
76. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587 n.7 (1978) (describing the value of computer
programs as $43.1 billion in 1976 and estimated to climb to $70.7 billion in 1980).
77. See BEN KLEMENS, MA+H YOU CAN’T USE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, AND SOFTWARE 6
(2006). Ben Klemens posits that the nature of the software writing process being
discoverable by independent inventors has in some ways fueled the increase in litigation
surrounding software patents. See id.
78. PLOTKIN, supra note 73, at 124; see also W. Wayt King, Jr., The Soul of the Virtual
Machine: In re Alappat, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 575, 576–77 (1995).
79. See Abstract, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003)
(defining abstract as “expressing a quality apart from an object”); see also In re Alappat, 33
F.3d 1526, 1542 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (defining abstract ideas as “disembodied concepts or
truths which are not ‘useful’ from a practical standpoint standing alone, i.e. they are not
‘useful’ until reduced to some practical application”); PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, LEGAL
ANALYSIS TO SUPPORT PROPOSED EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED
INVENTIONS 14 (1995), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/software/analysis/
softlaw.pdf (describing an abstract idea as “any sequence of mathematical operations that are
combined to solve a mathematical problem”) [http://perma.cc/N3DA-AWTC].
80. See Lemley et al., supra note 55, at 1316.
81. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 192–93 (1981)).
82. Id. at 606.
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These difficulties are unique.83 From the time the patent statutes were
enacted through the Industrial Revolution, U.S. patent law has been able to
handle the introduction of revolutionary technology “without so much as a
hiccup.”84 Part of the reason scholars believe software is so difficult to
analyze under patent law is that its “ephemeral quality” does not fit
comfortably into the traditional notion of tools and “useful arts.”85
Software “has no physical manifestation beyond symbols on paper or bits
on a hard drive,”86 and there is no difference between software and
mathematics.87 Consequently, courts have had difficulty in determining
whether software ideas are patentable, as “pure mathematics cannot be
patented” under the judicial exceptions to patentability.88
The Supreme Court started to clarify its subject matter patentability
analysis in the information age in Gottschalk v. Benson,89 when it struck
down a patent application claiming a method for “converting binary coded
decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.”90 In the Court’s view,
the patent claim fell within a judicial exception to § 10191—an attempt to
patent the formula for the algorithm for binary code.92 While it did not
uphold the patent, the Court was cognizant that it must not hinder the
invention of new technology,93 and it viewed the legislature as the proper
vehicle to make a determination as to whether patents of this sort should be
issued.94
Following Benson, the Court further expanded its analysis of patentable
subject matter in Parker v. Flook95 when it held that a patent attempting to
claim a “[m]ethod for [u]pdating [a]larm [l]imits” was invalid under
§ 101.96 Applying Benson, the Court found the patent did nothing more
than add a post-solution formula that was already known “within the prior
art.”97 In its analysis, the Court stated that the algorithm within the patent

83. See PLOTKIN, supra note 73, at 124.
84. Id. (describing how patent law has been flexible enough to accommodate the internal
combustion engine and the light bulb without significant changes); King, Jr., supra note 78,
at 575–76.
85. See King, Jr., supra note 78, at 576; see also KLEMENS, supra note 77, at 44;
PLOTKIN, supra note 73, at 126 (describing software as “abstract and intangible” and
traditional patent material as “concrete and tangible”).
86. See KLEMENS, supra note 77, at 44.
87. See id. at 26.
88. See id. at 44. Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (holding a
software patent application contained patentable subject matter under § 101), with Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (holding a patent containing software was invalid because it
fell within the judicial exception to § 101 for abstract ideas).
89. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
90. Id. at 64.
91. See id. at 71–72.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 71–73.
94. See id.
95. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
96. See id. at 585, 595 n.18 (“[A] claim for an improved method of calculation, even
when tied to a specific end use, [was] unpatentable subject matter under § 101.”).
97. See id. at 594.
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claim “is treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art.”98 As
such, the Court separated the part of the patent that included the abstract
idea from the rest of the claimed invention, but attempted to state that it still
was analyzing the claim as a whole.99
Even so, “proceed[ing] cautiously,”100 the Court did not foreclose all
patents involving computer programming,101 stating that computer
programs, which were “novel and useful,” might be deserving of patent
protection under § 101.102
However, shortly after deciding Flook, the Court again revisited subject
matter patentability in Diamond v. Diehr,103 analyzing whether a patent
application for a process molding raw rubber into cured precision products
contained patentable subject matter.104 The patent application claimed a
process that utilized a computer to implement the Arrhenius equation in
order to create “uniformly accurate cures,” which was well known at the
time in the industry for curing rubber.105 However, the Court found that
“processes” have always been patentable subject matter under § 101, and
“[i]f new and useful, [they are] just as patentable as is a piece of
machinery.”106
The Court then turned to whether the use of the equation caused the
patent application to fall under the judicial exception to § 101 for
mathematical formulas.107 Holding that because the patent application did
not seek to claim a mathematical formula, but instead a “process of curing
synthetic rubber,” it was patentable subject matter because it did not fall
under the judicial exception to the statute.108
While the equation was not patentable in “isolation,” it was not barred
from patentability under § 101 because the “process . . . for curing
rubber . . . incorporate[d] in it a more efficient solution of the
equation . . . .”109 The Court stressed that novelty should not be taken into
account while analyzing a claim under § 101 because it is “wholly apart
from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject
matter.”110
98. See id. at 592.
99. See id. at 591–92; see also John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says
Another: A Need for Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1781 (2014).
100. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 596.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 595.
103. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
104. See generally id.
105. See id. at 176–78.
106. See id. at 182–83 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1877)).
107. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187–88.
108. See id. at 188.
109. See id. at 188–92 (emphasis added) (describing how the invention must implement
or apply a formula in a way which, “when considered as a whole, is performing a function
which the patent laws were designed to protect”).
110. See id. at 190 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979)) (citing
legislative history indicating that § 101 describes patentable subject matter and § 102
“covers the conditions relating to novelty”).
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While the patent application met this requirement in Diehr, the Court
emphasized that this did not mean it would be eligible for patent protection
without satisfying the other requirements of the Patent Act.111
In some ways, it appears that the Court decisions in Diehr and Flook do
not align,112 although the Court did not overturn its prior decision113 and the
makeup of the Court did not change.114 Scholars are still debating and
analyzing the impacts of these opinions.115
Following the three above cases, the Court did not revisit the question of
subject matter patentability until its decision in Bilski v. Kappos116 roughly
twenty years later. In Bilski, the Court invalidated the patent, which
claimed a method for hedging risk that could be implemented by
commodities traders in the energy market, but stated that patents concerning
business methods could still contain patentable subject matter.117
Holding that the “machine or transformation” test was not the sole
indicator of whether a patent claimed an abstract idea, natural phenomenon,
or law of nature,118 the Court still viewed the test as a “useful and important
clue, an investigative tool” for determining whether process inventions
meet the § 101 threshold.119
After analyzing the plain meaning of the text and legislative history of
the statute, the Court stressed the “wide scope” that should be granted to
§ 101.120 In turn, the Court concluded that patents claiming business
methods could receive patent protection if they did not fall into a judicial
exception and complied with the other conditions of Title 35.121

111. See id. at 191 (describing how the invention must still be novel under § 102 and
nonobvious under § 103 in order to receive patent protection).
112. See Golden, supra note 99, at 1781–82 (discussing the inconsistencies between the
two opinions); see also Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV.
565, 573–76 (2015); Michel, supra note 50, at 1755–56 (discussing the inconsistencies of
Flook and Diehr).
113. Flook and Diehr have not been explicitly overturned. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355–56 (2014) (citing both Flook and Diehr).
114. The composition of the Supreme Court during both the Diehr and Flook decisions
were the same. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (with Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
White, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens comprising the majority opinion of the Court and
Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger in dissent); Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175 (1981) (with Justices Rehnquist, White, Powell, Stewart, and Chief Justice Burger
comprising the majority opinion and Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens in
dissent).
115. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
116. 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
117. See id. at 606–07 (“Section 101 . . . precludes the broad contention that the term
‘process’ categorically excludes business methods.”).
118. See id. at 603–04. The “machine-or-transformation” test states that for a process to
contain patentable subject matter, it must (1) be “tied to a particular machine or apparatus,”
or (2) transform “a particular article into a different state or thing.” See id. at 602 (quoting In
re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
119. See id. at 604. Justice Stevens called the machine-or-transformation test a “critical
clue.” Id. at 614 (Stevens, J., concurring).
120. See id. at 601 (majority opinion) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308
(1980)).
121. See id. at 601–02.
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However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens criticized the plurality
opinion stating that it did not “provide[] a satisfying account of what
constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea”122 and indicated that the plurality
may have blurred the line between the specificity requirement of § 112 and
what actually is patentable subject matter under § 101.123
Following Bilski, the analysis of abstract ideas under § 101 has been
greatly influenced by Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc.,124 although the claim at issue did not involve an abstract
idea.125 In Mayo, the Court struck down a patent claiming a process for
using thiopurine drugs to treat autoimmune diseases—specifically, for a
more precise way to calculate patients’ drug dosage126—because it found
that the claim did not add “enough” to the underlying natural law in order
for it to constitute patentable subject matter.127
To transform a law of nature into a patentable application, the Court
stated that the claimed patent must do more than state the law of nature and
say “apply it”—it must contain an “‘inventive concept’, sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon
the natural law itself.”128
However, the Court did not explicitly define what would constitute
“significantly more” in order to make an application of a natural law
patentable. A clue that the Court provided to determine if a claim added
“significantly more” was that the patent at issue should not state “wellunderstood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged” in by people
in the field of the claimed invention.129 But what makes industry practices
routine and conventional is debatable.130 In its analysis, the Court again
noted the danger in interpreting the judicial exceptions to patentability too
broadly, as doing so could be detrimental to patent law because “all
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”131
Most recently, the Supreme Court analyzed the subject matter
patentability of abstract ideas in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,
122. Id. at 621 (Stevens, J., concurring).
123. See id. at 620–21.
124. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); see also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347,
2356–57 (2014) (adopting the two-part test for analyzing laws of nature in Mayo to the
analysis of the patentability of abstract ideas).
125. See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1293–95 (analyzing a law of nature).
126. See id. at 1294–95.
127. See id. at 1297.
128. See id. at 1294.
129. See id. at 1299.
130. Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981) (finding a patentable
application of an abstract idea when a computer was added), with Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (finding the patent at issue contained unpatentable subject
matter by just adding “generic computer implementations”).
131. See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94 (cautioning application of the
judicial exception too broadly could “eviscerate patent law”); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2357
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 123 S. Ct. at 1293); Federico, supra note 47, at 177 (“In
one sense every invention is nothing but the result of new uses of old materials.”).
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which centered around a “computerized trading platform for exchanging
obligations in which a trusted third party settles obligations between a first
and second party so as to eliminate ‘settlement risk.’”132
Initially, the Federal Circuit held that the claim was a patent-eligible
application of an abstract idea.133 However, it issued an opinion vacating
its decision and granting an en banc hearing shortly afterward.134 Although
the en banc panel was highly fractured,135 the plurality opinion by Judge
Lourie analyzed the claim in light of the Supreme Court’s precedents in
Flook, Diehr, Bilski, and Mayo to come to the conclusion that the claim at
issue did not amount to “more than ‘well-understood, routine, conventional
activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.’”136
The Supreme Court then affirmed the en banc decision137 and adopted
the two-part framework to examine abstract ideas that it previously used to
examine laws of nature in Mayo.138 First, the Court determined that the
patents were directed to an abstract idea139—“intermediated settlement.”140
Then, it determined that the claims did not transform the abstract idea by
adding substantially more to it141 because it simply took the abstract idea of
settlement risk and implemented it using “wholly generic computer
implementation.”142 The Court came to its decision without defining what
“abstract” means.143 Instead, it simply compared the claims at issue to the
abstract idea in Bilski.144
132. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 685 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated, 484
Fed. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
133. See id. at 1343.
134. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1269–70 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en
banc), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
135. Judges Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach concurred in the plurality opinion;
Judges Rader, Linn, Moore, and O’Mally concurred in part and dissented in part; Judges
Moore, Rader, Linn, and O’Malley dissented in part; Judge Newman filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part; and Judges Linn and O’Malley dissented from the
court’s judgment. See id. at 1270. Commentators viewed the fractured nature of the opinion
as “add[ing] to the uncertainty” surrounding the patentability of computer inventions. See
Erika H. Arner & Lauren J. Dreyer, CLS Bank v. Alice Leads to an Even Murkier Morass,
230 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 44, 44 (2013).
136. See Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1283 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)).
137. See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2352.
138. See id. at 2355–57.
139. See id. at 2355.
140. See id. at 2352.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 2358.
143. Erik Paul Belt, Alice Doesn’t Live Here Anymore: A Critique of the Supreme
Court’s “Abstract Ideas” Test, 45 BPLA NEWSLETTER 3 (Winter 2015), http://www.bpla.
org/?NewsL20150102Alice [http://perma.cc/8ELG-JDUY]. Some scholars, such as former
Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, view that this use of “abstractness” to determine § 101
patentability has proved to be “entirely unworkable” due to the “vague and subjective”
nature of the term. See Brief of the Honorable Paul R. Michel as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Neither Party at 7, Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (No. 13–298) [hereinafter Michel Brief]
(describing how abstractness in patent law has led to “unpredictable results in the hands of
7,000 examiners and some 1,000 district judges, not to mention the countless thousands of
patent attorneys, inventors, business leaders, and investors”).
144. See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2358–59.
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D. What “Significantly More” Entails
In Alice, the Court stated that “wholly generic computer implementation”
did not add substantially more to the underlying idea145 and indicated that
“generic computer implementation[s]” would likely be those that only
improved efficiency146—although it did not actually explicitly define what
“wholly generic” consisted of with regard to computer software.147
Some members of the Federal Circuit shared Alice’s view of
“significantly more,” stating that “[u]nless the claims require a computer to
perform operations that are not merely accelerated calculations, a computer
does not itself confer patent eligibility.”148 The reason Judge Lourie cited
for this determination was that a “computer is just a calculator capable of
performing mental steps faster than a human could.”149
He is not alone in this assertion.150 Another Federal Circuit judge, Judge
Dyk, has held a similar position. In SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International
Trade Commission151—although the court ultimately determined that the
patents at issue152 contained patentable subject matter153—Judge Dyk
stated:
In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the
scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in permitting the claimed
method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious
mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e.,
through the utilization of a computer for performing calculations.154

In coming to this conclusion, he noted that although the claim at issue
contained mathematical calculations, the scope of the claim was properly

145. See id. at 2358.
146. See id. at 2358–59.
147. See id.; John Kong, Practical Points from the Supreme Court’s Alice Decision,
CAFC ALERT (June 19, 2014), http://cafc.whda.com/2014/06/practical-points-from-thesupreme-courts-alice-decision/ (describing how the court did not define what a “generic”
computer means) [http://perma.cc/WH8H-HFWG]. “Generic” is an adjective defined as
“relating to or characteristic of a whole group or class” or “having no particularly distinctive
quality or application.” See Generic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2003).
148. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc),
aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347.
149. See id.
150. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 n.18 (1978) (“[A] claim for an improved
method of calculation, even when tied to a specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter
under § 101.”); see also SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
151. 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
152. See id. at 1333. Judge Dyk describes “Assisted-GPS” technology as a process where
the navigation message from a satellite is “collected by a receiving station with an
unobstructed view of the sky, and then transmitted to GPS receivers via computer servers”
through a connection such as a wireless network. See id. at 1323.
153. See id. at 1333.
154. See id. (emphasis added).
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limited because there was “no evidence [in that case] that the
calculations . . . can be performed entirely in the human mind.”155
However, this view of “significantly more” is not without criticism.
Judge Rader,156 former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, raised a
proposition concerning whether speed can constitute a “meaningful
limitation” with regard to patent eligibility under § 101.157 While agreeing
with the prior Supreme Court precedent stating that a computer “does not
render [the claim] abstract,”158 he disagreed with Judge Lourie’s opinion
that “a computer must do something other than what a computer does
before it may be considered a patent-eligible invention.”159 He posited,
“[i]f a computer can do what a human can in a better, specifically limited
way,” the invention can cover patentable subject matter160—venturing to
say that “even an increase in speed alone may be sufficient to result in a
meaningful limitation.”161
Judge Rader provided an example: “[I]f a computer can perform a
process that would take a human an entire lifetime, a claim covering that
solution should be sufficiently limited to be patent eligible.”162
Prior courts have also held that specific increases in efficiency tied to
computers constituted patentable subject matter under § 101.163 In Diehr,
155. See id. Subsequent courts have also highlighted this limiting criteria. See, e.g.,
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(discussing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972), and describing that a calculation
that can be executed entirely by the human mind or by using pen and paper contained
unpatentable subject matter under § 101); see also Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life
Assurance. Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A] computer must be
integral to the claimed invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person making
calculations or computations could not.”); Belt, supra note 143 (discussing Tuxis Techs. v.
Amazon.com, No. 13-1771-RGA, 2014 WL 4382446 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014), and how claim
drafters should highlight the ability that makes a computer central to a claim, like
“require[ing] 10,000 operations or transactions per second,” that are unable to be mentally
calculated by a person).
156. Judge Randall Rader retired in 2014 after being on the Federal Circuit since 1990.
See History of the Federal Judiciary: Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 1789–
Present, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (search “Rader”) (last
visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/NBB7-KU73].
157. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1306 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (Rader, J., concurring), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
158. See id. at 1306; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010) (describing how
computer programs could be patentable); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“[A]
claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply
because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer.”); Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978).
159. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1306 n.7 (Rader, J., concurring).
160. Id.
161. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Rader’s idea might also be consistent with that of
Samuelson and Schultz, who explain that a clue for determining subject matter patentability
is whether the invention has “specific benefits that are measurable.” Pamela Samuelson &
Jason Schultz, “Clues” for Determining Whether Business and Service Innovations Are
Unpatentable Abstract Ideas, in PERSPECTIVES ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 8, 13
(Michael B. Abramowicz, James E. Daily & F. Scott Kieff eds., 2015).
162. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1306 n.7.
163. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188; Research Corp. Techs., v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d
859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding a patent claim for rendering gray scale images patentable
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the Supreme Court held that a patent that claimed “a more efficient solution
of the equation” utilized for curing rubber contained patentable subject
matter under § 101,164 and the decision has not been explicitly overruled.165
Whether the “significantly more” requirement of Alice has been met is
under further evaluation by lower courts and the USPTO.166
E. Alice: The Invalidator of Patents
Historically, once a patent was granted by the USPTO, it was presumed
valid by the courts absent “clear and convincing evidence”167 to the
contrary.168 Under § 282 of the Patent Act,169 when a patent’s validity is
challenged, the burden rests with the challenging party,170 and the court
must consider the patent’s validity in light of the whole invention or
discovery.171
However, since Alice, courts have been invalidating patents at a
“legendary rate.”172 The majority of lower courts have invalidated patents
under § 101 since June 2014, stating that the claims contain unpatentable
abstract ideas.173 As of June 2015, federal courts have invalidated seventyunder § 101 because “inventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies
in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory language to
the Patent Act”).
164. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added).
165. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014); David Kappos,
Symposium: Supreme Court Leaves Patent Protection for Software Innovation Intact,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-supremecourt-leaves-patent-protection-for-software-innovation-intact (discussing how “Diehr’s new
and useful process for curing rubber was held to be innately patentable” in Alice)
[http://perma.cc/AMT3-FLWS].
166. See infra Part I.E.
167. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
168. See Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1934).
169. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (providing that invalidity can be a defense to a patent
infringement claim and that “a patent shall be presumed valid”).
170. Id.; i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. at 2242.
171. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (stating that the “fact that by
themselves one or more steps might not be novel or independently eligible for patent
protection was irrelevant to the issue of whether the claims as a whole recited subject matter
eligible for patent protection”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010).
172. Lewis Hudnell, The Wonderland of Patent Ineligibility As Litigation Defense,
LAW360 (June 5, 2015, 10:19 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/662143/thewonderland-of-patent-ineligibility-as-litigation-defense [http://perma.cc/E29T-CCF2]; see
also Robert R. Sachs, Twenty-Two Ways Congress Can Save Section 101, BLISKIBLOG.COM
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/02/twenty-two-ways-congress-cansave-section-101.html [http://perma.cc/ZZA3-BVVJ].
173. See, e.g., Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 Fed. App’x 1005, 1006 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (applying Alice and invalidating a patent for a computer-aided management of a game
of bingo because it could be “carried out by a human using pen and paper”); buySAFE, Inc.
v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (applying Alice and invalidating the
patent); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. For Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d 271, 290
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); Comcast IP Holdings I, LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d 544,
551 (D. Del. 2014); Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 3d 813 (E.D.
Va. 2014). But see Card Verification Solutions, LLC v. Citigroup Inc., No. 13 C 6339, 2014
WL 4922524, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) (holding that the claimed patent describing a
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six out of 106 patent claims on § 101 grounds that have been analyzed
under the Alice framework.174 Some of this invalidation has taken place at
the motion to dismiss stage.175 Since Alice, more than 50 percent of
motions to dismiss patent infringement claims have been granted.176 This
has led to courts invalidating more patents under § 101 since Alice than they
had in the previous five years combined177 and to more uncertainty in
patent law—an effect that the judiciary has viewed negatively in the past.178
Likewise, the Alice framework has also affected the process by which
business method patents are evaluated by the USPTO. In response to the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Alice, the USPTO released preliminary
examination instructions with regard to examining patents involving
abstract ideas—specifically, computer-implemented abstract ideas.179
Patent examiners are to apply the Alice and Mayo framework to analyze all
judicial exceptions to patentability—not just laws of nature as was the
practice prior to Alice—as well as to all types of patent claims, whether the
claims purport to be product or process claims.180
First, patent examiners must analyze whether the claim covers an abstract
idea (or other judicial exception). If it does, then they must determine
whether “any element, or combination of elements, in the claim is sufficient
to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea
itself.”181
Following the issuance of its memorandum, the USPTO has since
withdrawn notice of allowances for some patent applications that it deemed
were most likely affected by Alice—applications claiming an abstract idea
involving generic computer implementation.182 And, since the Alice
means to verify “information for a transaction securely” contained an abstract idea, but
added “elements” to it in order to constitute patentable subject matter under § 101).
174. See Robert R. Sachs, The One Year Anniversary: The Aftermath of #Alicestorm,
BILSKIBLOG.COM (June 20, 2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/06/the-one-yearanniversary-the-aftermath-of-alicestorm.html [http://perma.cc/ASB3-9TB7].
175. Belt, supra note 143 (discussing Tuxis Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 131771-RGA, 2014 WL 4382446 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014)); see also Sachs, supra note 174
(detailing the number of patents that have been dismissed under § 101 at the motion to
dismiss stage after Alice); Sachs, supra note 172.
176. See Sachs, supra note 172.
177. See generally id.
178. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 613 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing
how keeping patent law “stable and clear” is of the utmost importance); In re Bilski, 545
F.3d 943, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“Uncertainty is the enemy of
innovation.”), aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 593; see also Timothy B. Dyk, Ten
Prescriptions for What Ails Patent Law, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 345, 350–51 (2014).
179. See Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent
Examination Policy, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, to Patent Examining Corp (June 25,
2014), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/
4F5H-NELB].
180. See id. at 2.
181. See id. at 3.
182. See Peggy Focarino, Update on USPTO’s Implementation of “Alice v. CLS Bank”,
DIRECTOR’S FORUM: A BLOG FROM USPTO’S LEADERSHIP (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.uspto.
gov/blog/director/entry/update_on_uspto_s_implementation [http://perma.cc/Q9CC-85XT].
Since the USPTO has implemented Alice in patent examinations, over 800 patent
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decision, the USPTO has received fewer filings claiming business
methods.183 As a result, scholars have expressed that this signals a
fundamental change in the “law and future of software patents.”184
II. THE CONFLICTING VIEWS ON WHETHER
ALICE EXCEEDS ITS § 101 BOUNDS
The test that the Supreme Court utilized for examining laws of nature in
Mayo, and abstract ideas in Alice, is not without criticism and, alternatively,
praise.185 Some individuals believe that the Alice framework has blurred
the procedural boundaries and requirements of the Patent Act, while others
believe that the Alice test conforms to the Patent Act’s framework of § 101
as a threshold inquiry. Part II of this Note discusses both viewpoints. First,
Part II.A describes the view that the Alice framework is unworkable
because it injects into the subject matter patentability analysis criteria that is
normally reserved for analysis under other sections of the Patent Act,
creating uncertainty and, with it, potential to stifle innovation. In contrast,
Part II.B describes the view that the Alice framework for analyzing subject
matter patentability conforms to the § 101 procedural framework as a
threshold inquiry, allowing the courts and the USPTO to efficiently process
patent claims and curb abusive patent litigation.
A. Alice Blurs the Lines
Some individuals take the view that the Alice framework has produced a
negative effect on patent law by blurring the § 101 criteria with the criteria
applications have been withdrawn. See Tristan Gray-Le Coz & Charles Duan, Apply It to the
USPTO: Review of the Implementation of Alice v. CLS Bank in Patent Examination, 2014
PATENTLY–O PATENT L.J. 1, 2. Software companies appear to be the most affected by the
Alice decision and “tens of thousands of assets owned by . . . IBM, Microsoft, Apple, Oracle,
Google and Cisco could be threatened by” the Alice holding. See Joff Wild, Big US Tech
Companies Face Major Patent Losses in the Post-Alice World, IAM Research Reveals, IAM
MAGAZINE (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=2028
b324-2d4a-4523-9f0d-f0773b8b3fa1 [http://perma.cc/B3DQ-C44X]. International Business
Machines Corporation (IBM), eBay Inc., and Microsoft Corporation were the top three
applicants with the most post-Alice withdrawals. See Gray-Le Coz & Duan, supra note 182,
at 5.
183. See “Stat of the Quarter”—Monthly Filings in USPC Classes 435, 506, 530, 536,
and 514 (Biologics and Diagnostic Methods) and USPC Class 705 (Business Methods), Not
Including RCEs, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last
visited Oct. 21, 2015) (depicting less business method filings per month than occurred in the
months prior to the Alice decision) [http://perma.cc/726F-M4S8].
184. See Gene Quinn, The Ramifications of Alice: A Conversation with Mark Lemley,
IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/04/the-ramifications-ofalice-a-conversation-with-mark-lemley/id=51023/ (depicting Quinn and Lemley agreeing
that Alice’s impact on patent law is significant due to the change in the way that lower courts
and the USPTO have analyzed patentability issues after Alice) [http://perma.cc/A7L2TUYB]; see also Timothy B. Lee, Software Patents Are Crumbling, Thanks to the Supreme
Court, VOX (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.vox.com/2014/9/12/6138483/software-patents-arecrumbling-thanks-to-the-supreme-court [http://perma.cc/68M3-A4W8].
185. See Michel Brief, supra note 143, at 9; see also Ted Sichelman, Funk Forward, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS 368–69 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2014).
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of other sections of the Patent Act. This, they claim, has led to further
uncertainty in the subject matter patentability analysis.186
Historically, courts have noted that references to novelty or obviousness
have no place in the § 101 analysis.187 In Flook, the Supreme Court was
explicit in delineating how the proper construction of § 101 eligibility “does
not involve the familiar issues of novelty and obviousness that routinely
arise under §§ 102 and 103 when the validity of a patent is challenged.”188
Likewise, in Diehr, the court stated “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps
in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining
whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of
possibly patentable subject matter.”189 Citing both Diehr and Flook, Justice
Stevens voiced similar concerns in his Bilski concurrence.190 Justice
Stevens was critical of the Court’s reasoning, which appeared to bring
novelty and other claim construction criteria into the subject matter
patentability inquiry.191
Likewise, the Federal Circuit has previously stated that analyzing § 101
validity concerns prior to resolving any claim construction issues is not
desirable.192 The court explained that “the determination of patent
eligibility requires a full understanding of the basic character of the claimed
subject matter.”193
Without allowing for this understanding of the basic character of the
claim, some practitioners view the Court’s analysis of abstract ideas in
Alice as blurring and interjecting § 102 and § 103 requirements into the
§ 101 analysis.194 Evidence of this blurring can been seen in opinions
186. See generally Where Do We Stand One Year After Alice, LAW360 (June 17, 2015,
8:27 PM) [hereinafter Where Do We Stand], http://www.law360.com/articles/
668773/where-do-we-stand-one-year-after-alice [http://perma.cc/49Y4-GVJJ].
187. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–90 (1981); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 620–21 (2010).
188. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978).
189. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189–90 (citing cases stating that the questions of § 101 and
those that involve novelty are separate inquiries).
190. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 620–21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
191. See id. (“[T]he fact that hedging is ‘long prevalent in our system of commerce[]’ . . .
cannot justify the Court’s conclusion, as ‘the proper construction of § 101 . . . does not
involve the familiar issu[e] of novelty that arise[s] under § 102.” (internal citation omitted)).
192. See Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1273–74
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
193. See id.
194. See Belt, supra note 143; see also Kristen Osenga, Still Aiming at the Wrong Target:
A Case for Business Method and Software Patents from a Business Perspective, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER, supra note 161, at 29, 40 (stating that
“inquiries into novelty and nonobviousness have been hopelessly entwined into the § 101
analysis”); David Bohrer, Guest Post: In Rush to Invalidate Patents at Pleadings Stage, Are
Courts Coloring Outside the Lines?, PATENTLYO (July 1, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/
2015/07/invalidate-pleadings-coloring.html [http://perma.cc/DLD2-RQNR]; John Duffy,
Opinion Analysis: The Uncertain Expansion of Judge-Made Exceptions to Patentability,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014, 12:46 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinionanalysis-the-uncertain-expansion-of-judge-made-exceptions-to-patentability/
[http://
perma.cc/PX6Y-4A8D]; David Hricik, Which Side of the Mushroom Did Alice Eat From?,
PATENTLYO (June 22, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/hricik/2014/06/which-mushroomalice.html (describing the ambiguity of the Alice decision by stating “[it] is going to cause us
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where language that has been used to invalidate patents is more reminiscent
of the § 102 and § 103 requirements.195 For instance, courts have used
descriptions such as “conventional,”196 “long prevalent,”197 “routine,”198
and “well-known”199 to analyze § 101 claims—“improperly comingl[ing]
patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with what is more appropriately an
issue of patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and/or 35 U.S.C. § 103.”200
While this criticism arguably is not new,201 it has been exacerbated with the
use of the Alice framework.
This analysis is troubling to practitioners because it may allow courts to
dispose of litigation without subjecting the claims to the clear and
convincing evidence standard traditionally required under § 102 and
§ 103.202 Unlike analysis under § 102 and § 103, subject matter

all to bang our heads, stub our toes, and wander through Wonderland for many years to
come”) [http://perma.cc/67PN-ZDW7]; Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Three Faces of Prometheus:
Alice and Generic Application, PATENTLYO (June 24, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/
2014/06/prometheus-generic-application.html (“Alice may fail to provide clear boundaries
for the eligibility of computer-implemented inventions.”) [http://perma.cc/JK54-X4JA]; Rob
Merges, Symposium: Go Ask Alice—What Can You Patent After Alice v. CLS Bank?,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-go-askalice-what-can-you-patent-after-alice-v-cls-bank/ (referring to the Supreme Court’s holding
in Alice: “There is bound to be an enormous amount of argumentation over this framework
in cases yet to come”) [http://perma.cc/4DSQ-A88P]; Michel, supra note 50, at 1753
(describing how “you can’t look at § 101[] in isolation from § 102,[] § 103,[] and § 112,[]
and have it work very well”).
195. See Belt, supra note 143.
196. See Loyalty Conversion Sys. Corp. v. Am. Airlines, LLC, 66 F. Supp. 3d 829, 843
(E.D. Tex. 2014); CMG Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pacific Tr. Bank, 50 F. Supp. 3d 1306, 1326
(C.D. Cal. 2014); DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d 271, 287–
88 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
197. See DietGoal Innovations LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 283 (invalidating a patent because
the practice was “long prevalent”).
198. See Loyalty Conversion Sys. Corp., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 838; Walker Dig., LLC v.
Google, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 501, 511, 515 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014); CMG Fin. Servs., Inc., 50
F. Supp. 3d at 1326.
199. See I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 976 Fed. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J.,
concurring) (describing that the patent should have been invalidated for containing ineligible
subject matter by using the phrase “well-known”).
200. See Eric Guttag, The Broken Patent-Eligibility Test of Alice and Mayo: Why We
Urgently Need to Return to Principles of Diehr and Chakrabarty, IPWATCHDOG.COM (Sept.
25, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/25/broken-patent-eligibility-test-of-aliceand-mayo/id=51370/ [http://perma.cc/3PNF-FHQS].
201. See Sachs, supra note 172 (noting criticisms of the consideration of novelty in the
§ 101 analyses have been around since Flook); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 600
(1978) (Stewart, J. dissenting) (describing how Flook “import[ed] into its inquiry under 35
U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and inventiveness”).
202. See Belt, supra note 143; Bohrer, supra note 194; see also Osenga, supra note 194,
at 30 (stating that “the PTO and the courts are using proxy-type inquiries to cut off the
patentability analysis of these inventions at the threshold step”); Where Do We Stand, supra
note 186 (describing Chuck Ebertin’s view that “[c]ourts are now invalidating patent after
patent using their own subjective views as to what is sufficiently inventive to be patent
eligible instead of applying the objective standards set forth in section 103”); Kong, supra
note 147 (discussing the clear and convincing evidence required to determine that a claim is
“conventional” under § 102 and § 103).
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patentability analysis is subject to de novo review by the Federal Circuit
because it is a question of law.203
Consequently, whether they should or not, courts have already begun to
dismiss patent claims at the motion to dismiss stage204 without citing any
supportive language from the Patent Act.205 As David Stein, a patent
practitioner, notes as of September 2014, “not one” court decision
invalidating a patent under § 101 did so citing to any legislative history to
support its interpretation; rather, courts relied on only other court
opinions.206
Because of this, “[t]he federal courts, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,
and the USPTO are using the very lack of a[n] [abstract ideas] definition to
liberally expand the contours of abstract ideas to cover everything from
computer animation to database architecture . . . .”207 Arguably, this liberal
invalidation of claims for failing to contain patentable subject matter does
not comport with the traditional interpretation of subject matter
patentability. Contrary to Judge Rader’s position, dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter eligibility is no longer an exception.208
This early dismissal trend is troubling because the Supreme Court has not
ruled that the “presumption of validity” no longer applies to § 101.209
Although, historically, once a patent was issued by the USPTO it was
presumed to be valid, scholars argue that “[t]he presumption of validity and
the burden of clear and convincing evidence was nowhere to be seen” in
recent decisions to invalidate patent claims at the motion to dismiss stage
under § 101.210
This tendency to invalidate patents could stifle innovation. Some
members of the judiciary argue that the Supreme Court’s approach to
abstract ideas, and the Federal Circuit’s en banc plurality reasoning in Alice,
could “decimate the electronics and software industries.”211 Judge Moore,
203. Osenga, supra note 194, at 41.
204. See, e.g., Tuxis Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 13-1771-RGA, 2014 WL
4382446 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014) (granting a motion to dismiss a patent dispute under Rule
12(b)(6)); see also supra Part I.E.
205. David Stein, The Alice Trajectory, USPTO TALK (Sept. 27, 2014),
http://www.usptotalk.com/the-alice-trajectory/ [http://perma.cc/Q3C2-SDJ8].
206. See id.
207. Sachs, supra note 174.
208. See id. (describing how Judge Rader stated that “Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for lack of
eligible subject matter will be the exception, not the rule”); Where Do We Stand, supra note
186.
209. See Sachs, supra note 174; see also supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text. But
see Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 717 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J.,
concurring) (describing how “no presumption of eligibility attends the section 101 inquiry”).
210. Belt, supra note 143; see also Sachs, supra note 172 (stating that the behavior of the
courts “suggests that the presumption [of validity] in practice has no weight”). Presumption
of validity and clear and convincing evidence has traditionally been required when a court is
analyzing the validity of a patent. See supra Part I.E.
211. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“There has never been a case which could do more damage to
the patent system than this one.”), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); see also Michel Brief, supra
note 143, at 9.
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in a dissent to the same plurality opinion, observed that “[i]f all of the
claims of these [patents at hand] are ineligible, so too are the 320,799
patents which were granted from 1998–2011 in the technology era.”212
Similarly, former Chief Judge Michel argued that if the patents in Alice at
issue were not analyzed similar to that in Diehr, the concept of relative
abstractness will lead to confusion and would “cripple, if not destroy,
computer-related industries, of which there are many and which are vital to
the future of the country in today’s highly competitive global economy.”213
Chief Judge Michel warned of the possible negative ramifications of
defining the contours of patentable subject matter under § 101 too
narrowly.214 He cautioned that adopting the Court’s prior test for life
science § 101 cases would be “particularly unsuitable in computer cases
because any software solution can be described at high levels that will
necessarily be abstract, and lower levels that will not,” a way of
examination that he stated “does not fit the realities of computer
technology.”215 He feared analyzing software claims in this manner would
lead to invalidity of the claims216—a hypothesis that thus far has
occurred.217 Likewise, Chief Judge Michel claims that framework does not
create adequate incentives to invest money in new inventions and
innovations due to the uncertainty of subject matter patentability.218
In applying the Alice test to the patentability of abstract ideas, critics
argue that the Supreme Court seems to be making decisions about
patentability utilizing “gut reactions or even worse, huge assumptions.”219
212. See Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1313 n.1 (Moore, J., dissenting).
213. See Michel Brief, supra note 143, at 9. Former Chief Judge Paul Redmond Michel
served on the Federal Circuit from 1988 to 2010. See History of the Federal Judiciary:
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 1789–Present, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.
gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (search “Michel”) (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/
629W-WGVE].
214. See Michel Brief, supra note 143, at 2 (“The criteria for patent-eligibility should
exclude only clearly ineligible inventions, allowing the other sections of the Patent Act—
sections 102, 103, and 112 on conditions of patentability—to perform their respective
functions.”); see also Michel, supra note 50, at 1753 (describing how recent court decisions
lack broad perspectives regarding “the interaction of the different parts of the patent statute,
the interaction between the PTO, the courts, the companies, the inventors, [and] the
investors”).
215. See Michel Brief, supra note 143, at 8.
216. See id. at 11 (describing how if “the Court lets the [concept of abstractness] spread
and its edges bleed and blur, neither computer innovation nor the public at large will
benefit”).
217. See supra Part I.E.
218. See Michel, supra note 50, at 1760 (stating that the patent system is meant to induce
investments because “not all invention but most invention [] requires a lot of money”).
219. See Michel, supra note 50, at 1753; see also Eclipse IP LLC v. McKinley Equip.
Corp., No. SACV 14-154-GW (ajw), 2014 WL 4407592, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014);
Dennis Crouch, Abstract Idea: I Know It When I See It, PATENTLYO (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/abstract-know-when.html (describing Judge Wu’s
dismissal of a patent for containing an abstract idea under the Alice framework)
[http://perma.cc/3XES-RPR9]; Jason Rantanen, Alice, Artifice, and Action—and
Ultramercial, PATENTLYO (July 8, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/07/artifice-actionultramercial.html (“[Section] 101 determinations are in the end based on nothing more than
intuition.”) [http://perma.cc/M6UA-J8B9]; David Stein, Post-Alice Rationale for 35 USC
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For example, Judge Wu of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California likened the Supreme Court’s analysis in Alice to Justice
Stewart’s famous test for analyzing obscenity220—explaining it as an
unpredictable result that is problematic when patent applications must be
examined by USPTO patent examiners.221 One proposed cause of these
unpredictable results is that the Court has perpetuated unsubstantiated
assumptions regarding § 101 by repeating them in its decisions without
stating the data that it has relied upon in coming to its conclusions.222 An
example that former Chief Judge Michel provides is Justice Breyer’s claim
in Mayo that patents can stifle innovation, rather than incentivize it.223
Chief Judge Michel views Justice Breyer’s proclamation “as an oracular
truth” without data concerning that assessment.224 Likewise, in some
instances, the judiciary has been bound by the “sweeping language” in the
two-step framework, forcing them to invalidate patents where they “see no
reason, in policy or statute why, [the invention] should be deemed patent
ineligible.”225
This use of sweeping language can cause further uncertainty in patent
law that might affect innovation. Because inventors are sometimes required
to secure outside funding for their research, these inventors would favor
broader patent protection as “patents induce investments.”226 For example,
patents
assist
university
research
by
enabling
“successful
commercialization” of innovation, decreasing the risk to investors by
offering protection for the innovation, inducing investment as a result of
that protection, and allowing the “innovation to be quantified.”227
101 Ineligibility, USPTO TALK, http://www.usptotalk.com/post-alice-rationale-for-35-usc101-ineligibility/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (describing courts’ reasoning for invalidating
patents under § 101 after Alice as “subjective”) [http://perma.cc/F6X3-ETLH].
220. See Eclipse IP LLC, 2014 WL 4407592, at *3. In reference to obscenity, Justice
Stewart stated: “I know it when I see it.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
221. See Crouch, supra note 219.
222. See Michel, supra note 50, at 1754.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 1755 (stating the Court has “trapped [itself] by picking up dicta from
ancient Supreme Court cases and repeating it and repeating it and turning it into . . . oracular
truth”).
225. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Linn, J., Concurring).
226. See, e.g., Driving American Innovation: Creating Jobs and Boosting Our Economy:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 26 (2011) [hereinafter Driving American
Innovation Hearing] (statement of Scott Smith, Professor & Chair, Department of
Mechanical Engineering & Engineering Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte);
id. at 8 (statement of Anthony Atala, Director, Wake Forest Institute for Regenerative
Medicine, W.H. Boyce Professor & Chair, Department of Urology, Wake Forest University
School of Medicine) (describing the need for increased funding and “ensur[ed] intellectual
property protection for everything [the Wake Forest Institute for Regenerative Medicine]”
does).
227. See, e.g., id. at 26 (statement of Scott Smith, Professor & Chair, Department of
Mechanical Engineering & Engineering Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte).
“[S]oftware patents represent a significant and growing percentage of university patent
holdings.” Arti K. Rai, John R. Allison & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Software
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As a remedy to the blurring and innovation consequences, some
practitioners argue that Diehr should be codified by Congress in order to
remove novelty and obviousness language from the § 101 analysis.228
Likewise, judges have also advocated the use of § 102 and § 103 as a basis
of finding invalidity to avoid using the uncertain criteria surrounding
subject matter patentability and abstract ideas under Alice.229 Judge
Gilstrap of the Eastern District of Texas has even issued new procedures for
parties that wish to bring early motions to dismiss involving Alice.230 To
curb dismissal of infringement claims prior to discovery, if a party wants to
bring a motion to dismiss under Alice, Judge Gilstrap requires parties to
show good cause before leave from the court can be granted.231
B. The Alice Framework Is a Threshold Inquiry
In contrast to those that believe that the Alice framework blurs the
procedural bounds of § 101, some members of the judiciary, practitioners,
and scholars believe that the Supreme Court’s framework for analyzing
abstract ideas under Alice is within the § 101 procedural bounds as a
“threshold” inquiry. In prior decisions, the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit have recognized the subject matter patentability requirement of
§ 101 as a “threshold test.”232 And, although the Supreme Court has not
explicitly held that § 101 inquiries must be dealt with prior to analyzing
claim construction elements, both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court have suggested that § 101 inquiries should be addressed first, prior to
other invalidity issues.233
Recently, Judge Mayer of the Federal Circuit has become one of the most
vocal advocates of addressing § 101 invalidity issues prior to other

Ownership and Litigation, in PERSPECTIVES ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER, supra note
161, at 336, 340.
228. Sachs, supra note 172; see also Guttag, supra note 200 (urging Congress to curtail
the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice by codifying Diehr and Chakrabarty).
229. MySpace v. Graphon Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1258–62 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Practioners
have also expounded this view to avoid the “ridiculous and legally incorrect . . . lumping [of
all] the patentability requirements into a single 101 inquiry.” See Gene Quinn, Arbitrary and
Capricious: Exploring Judge Lourie’s Flip-Flop in Ultramercial, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 12,
2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/02/12/arbitrary-capricious-judge-lourie-flip-flopin-ultramercial/id=52865/ [http://perma.cc/HA9H-BT6L].
230. See, e.g., Christine M. Morgan & Jonah D. Mitchell, Judge Gilstrap Announces New
Procedure for “Alice” Motions in Patent Cases, TECH. L. DISPATCH (June 5, 2015),
http://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2015/06/intellectual-property/judge-gilstrapannounces-new-procedure-for-alice-motions-in-patent-cases/?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_
medium=syndication&utm_campaign=View-Original [http://perma.cc/4QFP-UN4G]. Judge
Gilstrap’s docket is one of the busiest patent dockets in the country. Id.
231. See id.
232. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010).
233. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (describing how an analysis of
§ 101 patentability “must precede determination of whether that discovery is, in fact, new or
obvious”); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Only if the requirements of
§ 101 are satisfied is the inventor allowed to pass through to the other requirements for
patentability.”).
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analyses.234 In his concurrence in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,235 and
his concurrence in I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc.,236 Judge Mayer stated that
subject matter patentability should be analyzed “at the very outset.”237 He
believes that “a court has no warrant to consider subordinate validity issues
such as non-obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 or adequate written
description under 35 U.S.C. § 112” before it is determined that the claim at
issue meets the § 101 threshold.238 Judge Mayer stated that the
presumption of validity normally afforded to granted patents no longer
applies in the § 101 analysis because the Supreme Court has not mentioned
any presumption of eligibility while issuing its most recent § 101
decisions.239 He also reasons that because the USPTO granted a majority
of patents under different eligibility standards that are now outdated in light
of Alice, they should not be given the presumption of validity.240
Judge Mayer also offered an explanation for why any potential overlap
between the § 101 subject matter patentability analysis, and the § 103
obviousness inquiry, conforms to their proper procedural roles:
Section 103 . . . asks the narrow question of whether particular claims are
obvious in view of the prior art. By contrast, the section 101 inquiry is
broader and more essential: it asks whether the claimed subject matter,
stripped of any conventional elements, is “the kind of ‘discover[y]’” that
the patent laws were intended to protect.241

As such, due to the different function of § 101 as a threshold inquiry,
disposing of unnecessary litigation could be achieved without having to
wade through costly claim construction proceedings.242 Judge Mayer, and
other scholars, have also posited that even if the lines between § 101 and
the novelty and obvious sections of the Patent Act have become blurred,

234. I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 Fed. App’x 982, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J.,
concurring).
235. 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring).
236. 576 Fed. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring).
237. See id.; Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 718 (Mayer, J., concurring) (describing how
section § 101 invalidity issues must be decided prior to deciding subordinate validity issues
like novelty, or obviousness).
238. See I/P Engine, Inc., 576 Fed. App’x at 995 (Mayer, J., concurring); see also
Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 718 (Mayer, J., concurring).
239. See Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 720–21 (Mayer, J., concurring).
240. See Jeffri A. Kaminski, Concurrence in Federal Circuit’s “Ultramercial” Ruling
Sends Pointed Message to Patent Litigants, THE WLF LEGAL PULSE (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://wlflegalpulse.com/2014/11/19/concurrence-in-federal-circuits-ultramercial-rulingsends-pointed-message-to-patent-litigants/ [http://perma.cc/Y6JL-LRJJ].
241. See I/P Engine, Inc., 576 Fed. App’x at 994 n.3 (Mayer, J., concurring) (quoting
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)).
242. See id. at 992–1000 (Mayer, J., concurring); Kickstarter, Inc. v. Fan Funded, LLC,
No. 1:11-cv-06909-KPF, 2015 WL 3947178, at *2 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015) (describing
how the dispute could have been disposed of in a motion for judgment on the pleadings); see
also Scott W. Doyle et al., A Trend Toward Earlier Resolution of Patent Eligibility in the
Post-Alice World?, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.bna.com/trend-towardearlier-n17179895618/ (discussing recent court decisions dismissing patent claims for
containing unpatentable subject matter in the pleadings stages prior to reviewing § 102,
§ 103, or § 112 criteria) [http://perma.cc/J9HW-ADGL].
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this might be a good thing.243 He goes so far as to say the wide application
of § 101 as a threshold inquiry can “cure systemic constitutional
infirmities” by diminishing the prevalence of patents that hinder and stifle
technological progress by invalidating them.244 Although Judge Mayer’s
concurrence was nonbinding, courts in the District of Delaware and the
Eastern District of Texas have followed suit.245
This disposal of unworthy patent claims is beneficial because the patent
system needs to be made more efficient.246 Currently, there are over
550,000 patent applications waiting to be examined by the USPTO,247 and
some scholars and practitioners believe that Alice allows courts, and the
USPTO, to improve efficiency by disposing of cases involving patent
trolls.248 Because “§ 101 determinations are made on the claim language
alone,” dismissing claims under § 101 could save time and resources
because it would prevent the need for “extensive research into the state of
the art or the details of [the claim] documents.”249 This ability to dispose of
frivolous claims under § 101 can help curb “unwarranted and inappropriate
patent litigation” involving patent trolls.250
According to Mark Lemley, a preeminent patent law scholar, these
unwarranted lawsuits involving patent trolls have been curbed following
Alice.251 Finding a way to dispose of abusive patents inexpensively,
reliably, and early in the litigation process is a desirable goal.252 Since

243. See Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 722 n.2 (Mayer, J., concurring) (citing Gerard N.
Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods & Industry Norms, 2009 BYU L.
REV. 875, 900).
244. See id. at 722 n.2.
245. See Kaminski, supra note 240.
246. See Dyk, supra note 178, at 347–48 (describing the substantial backlog that faces
patent applicants, patent examiners, and the Patent and Trademark Board of Appeals).
247. See Patent UPR Application Backlog, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/corda/
dashboards/patents/kpis/kpiBacklogDrilldown.kpixml (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) (depicting
over 569,000 patent applications waiting to be examined as of June 2015)
[http://perma.cc/UEQ5-3XWM].
248. See Bohrer, supra note 194; Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 161, at 26; see also
Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 719. The term “patent troll” is used to denote “entities that
acquire patents for rent-seeking but that do not actually produce products covered by the
patent.” Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 161, at 27.
249. Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 161, at 26.
250. Id. at 27. Members of the judiciary also support this position. For instance, Judge
Mayer supports the use of Alice at the motion to dismiss stage to achieve efficiency goals.
See, e.g., Bohrer, supra note 194. But see CLS Bank v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1284
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J., concurring) (cautioning against the use of § 101 first as a basis
for invalidity).
251. See James Bessen, What the Courts Did to Curb Patent Trolling—for Now, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2014) (citing Mark Lemley), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2014/12/what-the-courts-did-to-curb-patent-trollingfor-now/383138/ [http://perma.
cc/3BKP-EF7C].
252. See Michel, supra note 50, at 1761 (identifying the fact that the patent system needs
to more efficiently process claims and dispose of litigation); see also Dyk, supra note 178, at
352 (stating that “[l]imiting discovery is important, as is limiting the length of a trial”
involving patent disputes).
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Alice, courts have efficiently disposed of inappropriate litigation because
the § 101 subject matter patentability question is a “threshold inquiry.”253
Because of this, Alice “protects against patents that serve as barriers to
scientific inquiry and progress.”254 Businesses have advocated that overly
broad patents granted for business methods—an area that the Supreme
Court has identified as being susceptible to containing abstract ideas255—
disrupts innovation because they lead to a rise in litigation costs and they
divert resources that companies could use for research and development
purposes.256 Robert Plotkin argues that this rise in overly broad patents can
“stifle innovation” by causing a situation where companies cannot innovate
without spending resources consulting with a large number of patent
holders.257 Arguably, the Alice decision has led to a decrease in the
resources companies waste trying to prevent infringement of overly broad
patents because those businesses accused of infringing upon them are able
to avoid discovery costs by having the claim dismissed at the motion to
dismiss stage.258
Scholars also argue that the types of patents that usually are analyzed
under the Alice framework—business method patents—do not require
patent incentives for innovation to take place.259 Samuelson and Schultz
contend that business and service industries rely on tactics like “first mover
advantage[], complementary assets, trade secrets, and consumer loyalty”
253. Kickstarter, Inc. v. Fan Funded, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-06909-KPF, 2015 WL 3947178,
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015) (citing Fort Properties, Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671
F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
254. See Sandra Park, Symposium: The Supreme Court As Promoter of Progress,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014, 10:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/
symposium-the-supreme-court-as-promoter-of-progress/ [http://perma.cc/2BHX-Q4N8].
255. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612–13 (2010) (invalidating a business
method patent for containing a patent ineligible abstract idea).
256. See, e.g., Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs,
and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and
the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 42, 46 (2013) (statement of John
Boswell, Senior Vice President & General Counsel, SAS Institution Inc.) (describing
“software and business method patents with fuzzy boundaries” as “weapons of mass
destruction,” and describing how SAS spent over $8 million defending against a single
patent infringement suit, and it “is money SAS no longer has to invest in people, facilities,
research, or product development”); id. at 55 (statement of Philip S. Johnson, Chief
Intellectual Property Counsel, Johnson & Johnson) (praising recent decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit that enable “requirements to ensure that overly vague and
ambiguous patents will not be upheld”); id. at 10–11 (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior
Vice President & General Counsel, Cisco Systems) (describing how Cisco spends $50
million dollars on patent litigation a year, and “in order to fund the litigation,” the company
reduced the number of new patent filings that it makes in a year by 300 patents); id. at 36
(statement of Janet L. Dhillon, Executive Vice President, General Counsel & Corporation
Secretary, JCPenny Co., Inc.) (describing how J.C. Penny has to settle patent infringement
suits concerning overly broad patents because “[i]n the retail business, our margins are
already thin and the decision to settle or go to trial and spend millions of dollars litigating
what we know is a junk patent has to be weighed against growing our business”).
257. See PLOTKIN, supra note 73, at 136. Plotkin describes this situation of having to
obtain permission from a large number of patent holders as a “patent thicket.” See id.
258. See, e.g., Bessen, supra note 251.
259. See Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 161, at 17.
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instead of patent protection.260 Likewise, scholars argue that patents on
business methods do not incentivize innovation because business method
innovations are typically not as expensive as innovations in other researchand development-heavy industries.261 Consequently, “[w]ithout high upfront costs to recoup, there is simply less need to protect business and
service innovations with patents.”262
The software industry has not traditionally lobbied for increased patent
protection, and it is unique compared to other industries in this respect.263
One reason put forth for this phenomenon is that the software industry’s
rate of innovation is faster than the patent system is able to grant
protection.264 Subsequently, the cost of obtaining a patent is simply not
worth the benefit to software companies because the technology in the
industry evolves so quickly.265 As a result, the reduced effectiveness of
patent trolls, and the efficiency that the Alice framework provides, has
produced a positive effect on patent law while conforming to the procedural
framework of the Patent Act.
III. RESTORING § 101 TO A THRESHOLD INQUIRY AND NOTHING MORE
Part III of this Note argues, ultimately, that the Alice framework injects
uncertain and subjective analysis into the subject matter patentability
review by blurring the § 101 requirements with the requirements of other
sections of the Patent Act. This Note contends that by importing language
traditionally reserved for § 102, § 103, and § 112, Alice allows judges to
review information subjectively that would normally be subject to
objective, clear, and convincing evidence standards. As a result, the Alice
framework oversteps the bounds of § 101.
Alice blurs the lines of § 101 for three reasons: (1) it imports criteria into
the § 101 analysis that is traditionally reserved for other sections of the
patent act; (2) it creates unnecessary uncertainty by replacing the objective
criteria utilized by § 102 and § 103 with subjective criteria; and (3) it allows
260. See id. at 18–19.
261. See id.; see also HAZEL V.J. MOIR, PATENT POLICY AND INNOVATION: DO LEGAL
RULES DELIVER EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC OUTCOMES? 66 (2013) (describing how techniques for
data compression that allow fast data transmission should not be patentable because of the
low research and development costs involved in their invention).
262. See Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 161, at 21.
263. See PLOTKIN, supra note 73, at 125 (stating that large companies in the software
industry had testified “in opposition to software patents as recently as the 1990s,” and
describing Microsoft, Oracle, and Autodesk’s testimony against software patents).
264. See id. (describing how software companies argued that innovation in the industry
was proceeding at “blinding speed” absent software patents); see also Innovation in America
(Part II): The Role of Technology: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 137, 161 (2013)
[hereinafter Innovation in America Hearing] (statement of Nathan Seidle, President & Chief
Executive Officer, Sparkfun Electric) (describing how “the creation of a patent and the
enforcement of a patent are merely distractions to innovation”).
265. See, e.g., Innovation in America Hearing, supra note 264, at 161 (statement of
Nathan Seidle, President & Chief Executive Officer, Sparkfun Electric) (stating, “The pace
of the patent system makes obtaining a patent irrelevant in our technological company where
the product is measured in weeks, not years”).
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courts to exercise a policymaking function in place of congressional
decision making.
First, the Alice framework blurs the § 101 bounds because it ignores the
plain meaning of the Patent Act, does not cite any legislative history
supporting its position, and ignores prior precedent. Unlike prior court
decisions,266 the Alice framework does not look to the plain meaning of
§ 101, and although the Supreme Court had stated that the plain meaning of
§ 101 should be given “wide scope,” the Alice framework seems to have
limited the patentability of inventions utilizing computers.267
As lower court decisions have demonstrated, the language that has been
used to invalidate patents under § 101 has been rife with adjectives like
“conventional,” “well known,” and “routine,”268 importing issues of
novelty and obviousness to the subject matter patentability analysis—a
practice that traditionally has been held by the Supreme Court to have no
relevance for § 101 questions.269 In Flook, Diehr, and Justice Stevens’s
concurrence in Bilski, the subject matter patentability of the claim was
described as a separate inquiry from novelty or nonobviousness.270 As a
result, importing these criteria arguably does not comport with precedent.
Although some view this overlap in language as permissive, like Judge
Mayer,271 it has caused subjective determinations to be made regarding
when a claim is “routine” or “conventional” instead of using the more
objective criteria that § 102 and § 103 require to determine
conventionality.272 Section 101 is a threshold inquiry,273 but the judicial
exceptions to patentability should not be allowed to swallow patent law
whole. Courts have routinely exercised caution not to apply the judicial
exceptions to patentability too broadly274 and not to foreclose patents
involving computer technology.275 However, in implementing the Alice
framework, this seems to have occurred.276
Despite the distinction that Judge Mayer has made regarding § 101 and
§ 103,277 determining what kinds of innovation the patent laws are designed
to protect has traditionally utilized all sections of the Patent Act.278 As

266. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part I.E (discussing the invalidation of patents).
268. See supra Part II.A.
269. See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 240–42 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 202–10 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 232–42 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 131 (discussing decisions cautioning applying judicial exceptions too
broadly).
275. See supra notes 100–02.
276. See supra Part I.E (discussing the large percentage of patents that have been
invalidated involving computers under § 101 since Alice).
277. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (describing that, to be patentable, a
claim must contain patentable subject matter, be novel, be nonobvious, and be particularly
described).
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such, appropriating § 101 to perform the job of other sections is
unwarranted.
Unlike Judge Mayer’s suggestion, a plain text reading of 35 U.S.C. § 282
would demonstrate that there is little ambiguity regarding whether a patent
should be presumed valid,279 despite the contention that the previous
methodology utilized by the USPTO undermines the presumption of
validity.280
Consequently, the blurring of the Patent Act criteria has created
uncertainty. Patent holders who expended time and resources to obtain
patent protection to protect their innovations have seen the rug swept out
from under them—having their patents dismissed at the pleading stage.281
What constitutes “significantly more” in order for an application of an
abstract idea to meet the Alice subject matter patentability requirement is in
flux,282 and Alice has given little guidance to the lower courts or to patent
examiners regarding when a claim contains patentable subject matter. This
had led to individualized—“I know it when I see it”283—analyses of when a
computer innovation can receive patent protection,284 an ailment of patent
law.285
Despite the benefits that commentators have cited, such as the diminished
effect of patent trolls and vexatious suits and improvement of patent
efficiency,286 using the Alice framework in order to accomplish these policy
goals is a role not normally performed by the judiciary. Unlike in Benson,
where the Court explicitly stated that it would hold off making policy
determinations better suited for the legislature,287 lower courts have
routinely cited policy reasons in invalidating patents for subject matter
patentability since Alice.288 Often, courts have not cited any concrete
statutory reasoning for invalidating the claims at issue, but instead cited
policy reasons, such as to “promote innovation.”289
As a remedy, this Note contends that a significant increase in speed or
efficiency added by an invention should constitute “significantly more” to
satisfy the second prong of Alice. Allowing speed or efficiency to
constitute “significantly more” will be beneficial for four reasons: (1) it
will allow § 101 to conform to its traditional role as a “coarse filter”; (2) it
will allow for greater certainty and stability in the subject matter
patentability analysis; (3) it will allow for increased innovation; and (4) it
will diminish the Supreme Court’s role as a policymaker.
279. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
280. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Part I.E.
282. See supra Part I.D (describing the difficulty of determining what “significantly
more” entails).
283. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
284. See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
286. See supra Part II.B.
287. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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Allowing speed or efficiency to play a part in the abstract idea analysis
would conform to the “coarse filter” statutory interpretation of § 101 that
the Supreme Court has adopted in its precedents.290 By interpreting § 101
as a coarse filter, courts have recognized that even if a patent contains
patentable subject matter under § 101, it still can be invalidated under other
provisions in the Patent Act291—prohibiting the need for § 101 to act as the
ultimate defense for invalidating undesirable patents.
The application of the current Supreme Court standard for analyzing the
patentability of abstract ideas has caused the Federal Circuit and district
courts to invalidate patent claims in the majority of implementations of the
Alice framework to date.292 These recent lower court holdings demonstrate
an upset in the balance between the broad scope traditionally given to
patentable subject matter under § 101 and protecting the basic building
blocks of innovation through the judicial exceptions to patentability.
Although an argument can be made that the inclusion of speed or
efficiency in the analysis could possibly hinder new discoveries by
prohibiting the use of some abstract ideas and laws of nature in the future if
the patent claiming the judicial exception is not narrowly tailored and broad
in scope,293 it must still be balanced by the propensity of the judicial
exception to swallow patent law whole.294 Because “all inventions at some
level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas,”295 allowing a substantial increase in speed or
efficiency to constitute “substantially more” can possibly restore the
balance between the text of § 101 and the judicial exceptions as it would
allow § 101 to work as a “coarse filter.”
In addition to restoring the balance between the patentable subject matter
and the judicial exceptions to § 101, allowing speed or efficiency to play a
part in the abstract idea analysis can contribute to the uniformity and
consistency of patent law that judges have been aspiring to create for
businesses and inventors.296 By allowing speed or efficiency to play a role,
courts would have a bright-line test to evaluate patent claims instead of
relying on ambiguous notions of “abstraction.” Because speed and
efficiency can be measured,297 they are likely better indicators of
patentability than the unquantifiable notion of abstract ideas that the
judiciary and the courts have viewed as ineffective to the patent analysis.298
290. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
292. See supra Part I.E.
293. See supra Part I.D.
294. See supra note 131.
295. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012);
see also supra note 131 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
297. See Speed, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003)
(describing speed as a “rate of motion”). “Efficiency” is defined as “effective operations as
measured by a comparison of production with cost as in energy, time, and money.” Id.
Efficiency.
298. See supra notes 78–88 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity involved in
defining abstract ideas).
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Although relying on the judiciary and patent examiners to determine
when there is a significant improvement in speed or efficiency may be hard
to measure if the patented advance is a process or method that takes varying
degrees of time during the course of ordinary business, including an
increase in speed or efficiency in the analysis could be beneficial. An
increase in speed or efficiency could provide a more concrete basis upon
which the courts and the USPTO could start the § 101 analysis rather than
simply determining if an invention contains an abstract idea, which has
been difficult to define.299
Similar to creating stability, allowing speed or efficiency to play a part in
the abstract idea analysis could give inventors incentive to discover new
technologies, for example evolving technologies such as the self-creating
inventions described by Robert Plotkin.300 The inclusion of speed or
efficiency would protect the value that is prized in modern invention,
particularly that which utilizes algorithms and computer programming in
the information age.
Although the software industry has not traditionally been a zealous
advocate for patent protection because its members claim allowing patent
protection in a rapidly changing industry might prohibit growth,301 large
software companies have recently begun applying for patent protection on
their inventions.302 Without allowing a significant increase in speed or
efficiency to play a role in the patentability analysis, it seems that these
patents from software companies will fail to meet the Alice test and will
nullify the companies’ investments.
In addition, a patent’s ability to be upheld by including a substantial
increase in speed or efficiency in the analysis could spur innovation in
inventors who require investment backing for their research.303 As stated
above, “patents induce investments,” and the ability of researches to
decrease risks to their investors by incentivizing them with patent
protection could assist university research.304
Lastly, the inclusion of an increase in speed or efficiency in the
“significantly more” analysis could reduce the role of the Supreme Court as
a policymaker. Having a bright-line indicator of whether an invention adds
“significantly more” to the underlying abstract idea will prevent courts from
weighing whether an invention ties up natural laws and inhibits future
discoveries305—a policy inquiry for which the courts are not well suited.
As described by former Chief Judge Michel, the Supreme Court has made
claims concerning the ability of patents to stifle innovation without citing
any data to substantiate its claim.306 This is dangerous because it allows
299. See supra notes 79–80.
300. See PLOTKIN, supra note 73.
301. See supra notes 264–65 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 49 (2008) (describing how “the major search engines have patent portfolios”).
303. See supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
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courts to invalidate patents on potentially false information. Analyzing
speed and efficiency will provide the court with data concerning an
invention’s usefulness instead of relying on an “I know it when I see it”307
analysis.
For these reasons, a substantial increase in speed or efficiency added by
an invention should be taken into account for determining patentability
under § 101.
CONCLUSION
Since the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the importance of patent
protection for inventors has “scarcely [been] questioned,”308 and the text of
the Intellectual Property Clause has been interpreted to allow “anything
under the sun that is made by man”309 to be patentable subject matter.
Allowing a significant increase in speed or efficiency added by an invention
or discovery to be taken into account for the purposes of determining
whether the invention falls into the judicial exception for abstract ideas will
restore the balance between the broad language of the statutory text and the
judicial exceptions to patentability that Alice has upset and blurred.
Using speed and efficiency to restore this balance will allow § 101 to act
as a “coarse filter,”310 while still providing “liberal encouragement”311 for
innovation by prohibiting inventions or discoveries that fail to meet the
other requirements contained in Title 35 from receiving patent protection.

307. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Steven, J., concurring); see also supra
notes 219–21 and accompanying text.
308. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 19, at 307 (James Madison).
309. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.

